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Abstract. The proliferation of advanced information technologies (IT),
especially the wide spread of Internet of Things (IoTs) makes wire-
less spectrum a precious resource. Cognitive radio network (CRN) has
been recognized as the key to achieve efficient utility of communication
bands. Because of the great difficulty, high complexity and regulations
in dynamic spectrum access (DSA), it is very challenging to protect
CRNs from malicious attackers or selfish abusers. Primary user emu-
lation (PUE) attacks is one type of easy-to-launch but hard-to-detect
attacks in CRNs that malicious entities mimic PU signals in order to
either occupy spectrum resource selfishly or conduct Denial of Service
(DoS) attacks. Inspired by the physical features widely used as the fin-
gerprint of variant electronic devices, an adaptive and realistic PUE at-
tack detection technique is proposed in this paper. It leverages the PU
transmission features that attackers are not able to mimic. In this work,
the transmission power is selected as one of the hard-to-mimic features
due to the intrinsic discrepancy between PUs and attackers, while con-
sidering constraints in real implementations. Our experimental results
verified the effectiveness and correctness of the proposed mechanism.
Keywords: Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs), Primary User Emulation (PUE)
Attacks, Detection, Hard-to-Mimic Features.
1 Introduction
The rigid spectrum allocation scheme regulated by governmental agencies leads
to great deficit on spectrum band resources. Static spectrum access technology
results in lots of waste on wireless spectrum resources. The emergence of new
intelligent spectrum allocation/re-allocation schemes, especially cognitive radio
network (CRN), are studied elaborately in the last decade, due to the ever-
increasing wireless applications. Cognitive radio (CR), or known as secondary
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user (SU) in CRN, is a technology that allows wireless devices (unlicensed users)
access spectrum resources dynamically without introducing major interference
to licensed primary users (PUs). Because of the great difficulty and high com-
plexity in dynamic spectrum access (DSA), and many open issues on security
deployment, CRN study still under development [25].
Spectrum sensing allows CRs acquire real-time spectrum occupation status
such that interleaving communications shared by PUs and SUs become feasible.
Basically, a well-designed CRN aims to serve for two purposes [3]: to maximize
the usage of spare spectrum resource as well as to protect the incumbent primary
system from secondary network interference. Due to the requirement to SUs that
they shall not interfere the PU functionalities, SUs should adapt their behaviour
in accordance to PU activities. Such requirement can be regarded as two separate
parts: (1) monitoring PU activities, and (2) behaving properly.
In general, knowing PU activities is essentially critical for cognitive radios
to share the spectrum resource with legitimate users. One of the effortless ways
to acquire PU activity information is that PUs are able to notify SUs their
spectrum usage status; or there exist a third party as an inquiry center that
knows what PUs will do in the near future. An alternative solution is to develop
robust and efficient spectrum sensing technique to acquire knowledge on PU
activities. Also, the spectrum sharing efficiency greatly depends on a secure CR
operating environment. In addition, due to the opportunistic spectrum access
(OSA) nature, CR systems encounter several CR-specified security problems.
Regarding spectrum sensing, one major challenge is to detect PU signals with
high accuracy while maintain low false alarm rate. The false detection rate may
become extraordinarily high when primary user emulation (PUE) attacks hap-
pen. A PUE attack is that malicious entities mimic PU signals in order to either
occupy spectrum resource selfishly or conduct Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
PUE attacks can be easily implemented in CRNs. It introduces great overhead on
cognitive radio communication and causes chaos in dynamic spectrum sensing
[9, 10]. However, defense against the PUE attacks is nontrivial because tradi-
tional authentication and authorization (AA) methods are no longer applicable
to CR systems. A more adaptive and practical PUE attack detection technique
is highly desired.
Inspired by radiometric used to identify short range transceivers and the
interpulse/intrapulse fingerprint in radar identification, we propose to detect
PUE attacks in CRN environment leveraging the hard-to-mimic PU transmission
features. As one type of hard-to-mimic feature, the PU transmission features are
determined by the inherent physical characteristics of the device. Attackers are
not able to generate such kind of features. A received signal strength (RSS)-
based hypothesis detection mechanism is designed, which can detect attackers
who attempt to fool the system by mimicking PUs’ patterns.
In general, RSS-based approaches have been studied elaborately in many
literatures for PUE attack defense. It is applied either as one direct rudimentary
feature of PU [6], or as the premise for PU localization [8,13,17]. These works can
be challenged by either smart attackers or the practical constraints such as SUs
are unaware of their geographical information. There are two major advantages
that make our work more feasible and efficient in real-world applications than
exiting solutions: (1) in general, our proposal allows mobility of nodes in the
CRN and does not require prior geographical information of either PUs, SUs,
or attackers; and (2) compared to machine learning or neural network based
methods, our proposal does not need the training process.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background
knowledge that motivated this work. Section 3 describes a practical CRN model
on which our detection mechanism is built. Section 4 discusses a PUE attack in-
tuition under perfect propagation model assumptions. The proposed RSS-based
PUE attack detection method is introduced in section 5. Section 6 presents a
tentative trail based on real-world measurements. Section 7 shows our numeri-
cal experimental results and comparison to other related schemes, and finally,
Section 8 concludes this paper.
2 Background Knowledge and Related Work
According to Federal Communications Commission (FCC): “no modification to
the incumbent signal should be required to accommodate opportunistic use of
the spectrum by Secondary Users (SUs)” [1]. Obviously FCC places constraints
on PUs such that PUs are not obligated to notify CR users with their activ-
ity scheduling and intention, neither to provide AA services. Consequently, CR
systems are expected to collect and process sufficient and highly accurate infor-
mation of the spectrum environment without imposing overhead on incumbent
users by adding new features, such as redundant symbolic pads or authentication
protocols.
In CR systems, it is necessary to distinguish attacker signals from PU signals
in spectrum sensing stage. PUE attacks will cause severe problems on the effi-
ciency of spectrum utility. Since no obligation is imposed on PUs, it is natural to
explore the features of different wireless transceivers. In general, there are two
categories of transceiver features: the primary/strong radiometric/fingerprint,
and the secondary/weak radiometric. The primary radiometric denotes the in-
trinsic characteristics or imperfections of wireless transceivers, that can be used
to identify the uniqueness of the hardware. Transient is one of the most discussed
radiometric that can be used to identify short range transceivers. Transient is
the part of the signal where the amplitude rises from background noise to full
power. In literature, five transient features are used [22]:
1. The length of the transient, along the x-axis;
2. The variance of the normalized amplitude of the transient;
3. The number of peaks (periods) of the carrier signal in the transient;
4. The first part of a discrete wavelet transform of the transient; and
5. Difference between the normalized mean and the normalized maximum value
of the transient.
It is proved that transient features are useful fingerprints for wireless transceivers
identification. They are not well studied in PU recognition in CRNs, however,
due to the difficulties in detecting transient on the scale and scope of CRNs.
Another inspiration comes from radar identification, in which two kinds of
fingerprint are usually discussed. One is interpulse fingerprint that considers
factors including frequency, amplitude, pulse width, pulse repetition rate, etc.
The other one is intrapulse fingerprint that pays attention to pulse waveform
characteristics, such as unintentional modulation on pulse (UMOP) feature [15]
and time domain waveform feature, including rise slope and fall time, falling
angles, angle of pulse, and pulse point [14]. It looks intriguing, but requires
accurate measurements on signals that is usually not available for CRs.
There are other ideas based on the imperfections of transceivers such as
frequency offset error caused by different transmitter and receiver oscillators,
or modulation errors caused by the imperfection of electric circuits [5]. Usually,
those fingerprint extraction requires prior knowledge of modulation/mulplexing
technology, and it is often very computational intensive.
The secondary/weak radiometric usually does not identify signals from a
particular transceiver. Instead, it identifies signal characteristics that are not
reproducible to attackers. A smart attacker is able to mimic some PU signal
features such as spectrum bandwidth, activity pattern, and adaptively change
transmission power. Many studies tried to extract features of communication
channel of the wireless environment [6, 7, 13], which is known as geometrical
information of the PU transmitter, because PUs and attackers are unlikely be
at the same place.
Two types of channel fingerprint detection approaches are well discussed.
The first category is distance-based approaches [6]. A rudimentary approach
is to use RSS-based location estimation techniques, which record the received
energy level from the PU as the reference radiometric, and compare with the
sensed spectrum signal strength for detection. A novel idea was proposed to
deploy helper nodes around PUs, which are able to help verify PU signal based
on helper node’s authentic link signatures [16]. A smart attacker model was
presented to prove that the first order feature of RSS is not adequate for PUE
attacks detection, and then a RSS detection method using second order feature
is proposed to confront the smart attackers [6]. However, the assumption that
all SUs and PUs’ positions are prefixed and known is not applicable to many
situations in CRNs. The second category is location-based approach [13], which
requires geographical information from at least part of network participators. In
those proposals, peripherals such as GPS, helper nodes and prior knowledge of
PU position, are necessary.
PUE attack detection happens in spectrum sensing stage. In 2010, FCC an-
nounced that they adopted condition a device’s use of TV White Spaces on its
consultation of a geolocation database to ensure the availability of the desired
spectrum [4]. Several literatures have discussed the feasibility of constructing
PU activity database and the details in design of prototypes [11,18,21,24]. The
database will record, model and predict PU activities in order to regulate CR
access and optimize spectrum use efficiency. These base stations are able to
provide many critical PU information, such as geographical location, activity
pattern, and modulation/mulplexing technology. Even further, a FCC Commis-
sion’s Rule proposes that PUs such as Federal Primary Users are going to register
in a database before accessing 3.5 GHz band [2].
On one hand, while such kind of database model can eliminate PUE attacks,
they do violate the original FCC requirement [1]. Database enabled spectrum
sensing provides a new inspirations on against of PUE attack, but still remains
problematic. As the general PU information is known to CRs with involvement
of regular database, smart attackers can mimic PU signal features. In addition,
the geographic information of PU is not available for moving base stations or
radars. On the other hand, the PU registry approach has been deployed in very
limited scale, which is only in federal PU environments [2].
As discussed above, a more adaptive and practical PUE attack detection
technique is highly desired. Considering the limited prior knowledge of PUs
and constraints on computing resources of CRs, it is natural to extend our vi-
sion on hard-to-mimic PU signal features for PUE attack detection. While the
secondary radiometric can be easily reproduced by smart attackers, the actual
transmission power is an exception. Although the attacker can smartly adapt
their transmission power to disguise their locations, they are usually incapable
of mimicking counterpart power as PUs. PUs are usually radars, TV stations,
and cellular base stations, which signal strength is normally tens to thousands of
times higher comparing to what PUE attackers can produce [19]. For example,
the strength of CRs signals is normally in scale of milliwatts [19]. With coop-
erative spectrum sensing, and involvement of a fusion center (FC), the emitter
transmission power based PUE detection is applicable without requiring any
prior knowledge of PUs and CRs location information.
3 Detection Model
In CR spectrum sensing study, the cooperative sensing method is preferable
due to the well-known “hidden PU problem”. This problem happens when a
SU cannot sense an active PU either due to the PU signal is out of range or
because the signal faded away in concurrent wireless fading channel. In coopera-
tive spectrum sensing, CRs have to share their sensing results to obtain the most
comprehensive knowledge of the desired spectrum environment. In centralized
CRNs, a fusion center can collect and synthesize sensed spectrum information
from all CRs, and make a joint decision on PU appearance. Our detection model
is based on such deployment with the following assumptions.
– The PUs are either public infrastructures (i.e. TV stations) or federal facili-
ties (i.e. weather radar system). They have powerful transmission capability
to serve their own purposes.
– The PUs are not required to be geographically fixed, such that PUs including
moving radars or stations are considered.
Fig. 1. A centralized CRN sharing the spectrum with a PU.
– Without loss of generality, assume CRs and the FC are randomly scattered in
an circular area with radius of rCRN . CRs are not equipped with localization
peripherals, and they are unaware of the location of either themselves or the
peers.
– CRs are able to sense the radio environment and report processed spectrum
features to the FC.
– The FC can collect spectrum features from CRs and perform deliberate anal-
ysis. The FC has knowledge of general information of measured PUs, such as
their occupied spectrum bands, their approximate propagation power, etc.
Figure 1 shows a scenario of centralized CRN jointly share the spectrum
resource with a PU. In order to be more consistent to real-world situation, in
our detection model, the position of the PU and distances among each parties
are unknown, and there is not localization peripherals, such as GPS, time of
arrival (TOA) based equipment, is equipped by CRs because these peripherals
are unaffordable in many applications. In consequence, this detection model
poses a higher challenge on PUE attacks detection.
4 PUE Attacks Detection under perfect propagation
model
As discussed earlier, the attackers can hardly emit the magnitude of signal power
as PUs do, so the propagation power becomes a useful hard-to-mimic secondary
radiometric of transmitters. The challenge is, however, such a secondary ra-
diometric feature remains unmeasurable in wireless environment. Usually, the
receiver can measure the RSS, which is determined by many factors, such as
transmission power, propagation environment, and transmission distance.
An ideal propagation model, Free-Space Path Loss (FSPL) model, assumes
no obstructions between the transmitter and receiver, and the signal propagate
along a line-of-sight (LOS) channel. This ideal propagation model inspires a
reasonable intuition on PUE attacks detection. In this section, our new idea
on PUE attacks detection is introduced with consideration of some restrictions
in real world such as unknown PU and CRs locations, but we assume an ideal
wireless propagation environment. The FSPL model is expressed as:
Pr
Pt
=
Gl · λ2
(4pid)2
(1)
where Pr and Pt are received signal power and transmitted signal power respec-
tively; λ is signal wave length; d is the LOS distance between transmitter and
receiver; Gl is the product of the transmit and receive antenna field radiation
patterns, and it is a constant if the pattern is known. Thus, the received to
transmitted power ratio is proportional to the reciprocal of d2 as:
Pr
Pt
∝ 1
d2
(2)
4.1 A Naive Detection Model
In the ideal propagation model, given the RSS measurement and global infor-
mation of PU propagation power, the transmitter-receiver distance is deducible,
which gives us a hint on the relation between the uncloneable radio feature
Pt and the wireless channel feature d. In our PUE attacks detection model, a
hypothesis test is adopted to decide the presence of the attacker.
H0 : the signal is from the PU
H1 : the signal is from the attacker
The PU propagation power is usually in scale of hundreds or thousands of
watts, defined as Pt,pu. In contrast, the attacker, usually comparable to CRs, has
the propagation power of tens to hundreds of milliwatts, defined as Pt,attacker.
Thus, the ratio of PU propagation power to attacker propagation power is com-
puted as R = Pt,pu/Pt,attacker.
In a CRN with N CRs, the transmitter-receiver distance di (i = 1, 0, · · · , N)
can be easily computed given the propagation power Pt,pu and individual CR
received power Pr,i. If the signal is transmitted by the PU, the distance is com-
puted as:
di = M ·
√
Pt,pu
Pr,i
= di,pu (3)
Here, M is defined as a constant M =
√
Gl·λ2
(4pi)2 . Similarly, if the signal is
transmitted by the attacker, the distance is computed as:
di = M ·
√
Pt,pu
Pr,i
= M ·
√
Pt,attacker
Pr,i
·
√
R
= di,attacker ·
√
R (4)
Fig. 2. In the case of PU transmission, compute distance range between the transmitter
and the FC. The radius of blue circles are the lower bounds of dpu,fc, computed as
|di − di,fc|; the radius of green circles are the upper bounds of dpu,fc, computed as
di + di,fc. The PU is supposed to locate between the lower and upper bounds.
Further, if the distance between individual CR and the FC di,fc is also known,
ideally, it is easy to infer to the distance between the PU and the FC in a range
dpu,fc ∈ [max(|di − di,fc|),min(di + di,fc)]. If the signal is transmitted by the
PU, the computed dpu,fc does not belong to an empty set, as demonstrated in
Fig. 2. If the signal is transmitted from the attacker, the distance is computed
as di = di,attacker ·
√
R, according to Eq. 4. Thus, the range set dattacker,fc ∈
[max(|di,attacker ·
√
R− di,fc|),min(di,attacker ·
√
R+ di,fc)] is possibly empty as
shown by Fig. 3. The FC can apply the hypothesis test by:
– If (di + di,fc) ≥ |dj − dj,fc|,∀i, j = 1, 2, · · · , N , the signal is from the PU
(H0); or
– If (di+di,fc) < |dj−dj,fc|,∃i, j = 1, 2, · · · , N , the signal is from the attacker
(H1).
Following the hypothesis test, the detection rate Pd is calculated as:
Pd = 1− Pfn
≥ 1− Pr{di,attacker − dj,attacker ≤ di,fc + dj,fc√
R
,
∀i, j = 1, 2, · · · , N}
≥ 1− (1− (
rCRN − max(di,fc+dj,fc)√R
rCRN
)2)N , (5)
where Pfn = Pr(H0|H1) is the false negative probability. In Eq. 5, the first in-
equality originates from the expansion of the inequality to the abosulote value of
Fig. 3. In the case of PUE attacks, compute distance range between the transmitter
and the FC. The radius of blue circles are the lower bounds of dattacker,fc, computed
as |di−di,fc|; the radius of green circles are the upper bounds of dattacker,fc, computed
as di + di,fc. The figure shows no intersection between the lower and upper bounds.
|di − di,fc|. The second inequality can be explained that the greatest false neg-
ative probability happens (suppose
max(di,fc+dj,fc)√
R
≤ rCRN ) when the attacker
is located in the center of CRN, and all CRs are located in the ring-shape area
centered at the attacker with inner radius of rCRN − max(di,fc+dj,fc)√R and outer
radius of rCRN . The false positive probability Pfp = Pr(H1|H0) is zero under
such hypothesis test condition.
4.2 Evaluation of hypothesis test by Monte Carlo method
A Monte Carlo method is applied to calculate the detection accuracy in a sce-
nario where CRs and attackers are randomly distributed in an circular area,
which is centered at the FC with radius rCRN . Figure 4 shows the result. The
detection accuracy Pd increases dramatically as the number of CRs increases.
And Pd is approaching one when there are more than four CRs in the testing
scenario.
5 A RSS based PUE attack detection approach
The above hypothesis test is discussed under ideal propagation model, which
provides a reasonable intuition on PUE attack detection, with the given prop-
agation power features of PUs and attackers. But, in reality, the RSS based
distance measurement method is not well applicable for several reasons. First of
all, the FSPL propagation model cannot faithfully describe the actual propaga-
tion environment. Secondly, signal propagation patterns are variant in different
environments. Also, RSS can be vary by a large magnitude over short distances.
Therefore, we choose the single transmitter log-normal shadowing fading
propagation model to describe the relationship among transmitted power Pt,
received signal power Pr, and distance d between transmitter and receiver.
Fig. 4. The detection accuracy of the hypothesis test computed by Monte Carlo method
with different number of CRs in the CRN. For each different number of CRs, repeat
the hypothesis test for 100000 times.
Pr(dBm) = Pt(dBm) +K(dB)− 10γlog10 d
d0
+G (6)
where Pt and Pr are measured in dBm. K is the path loss variable at the refer-
ence distance d0, which depends on the antenna characteristics and propagation
environment. γ is the empirical path loss exponent, which is learned to have
different values in different environment [12]. Table 1 presents some γ values
measured by empirical studies. G is a normal random variable with zero mean
and standard deviation σ. Most empirical studies for outdoor channels measure
the standard deviation σ ∈ (5, 12) in macrocells and σ ∈ (4, 13) in microcells
[12].
Table 1. Empirical Path Loss Exponents γ
Environment γ range
Urban macrocells 3.7− 6.5
Urban microcells 2.7− 3.5
Factory 1.6− 3.3
Over the years of development, a number of propagation models have been
developed in different wireless environments, such as Hata model, COST231
model, piecewise linear model, etc. [12]. In some literatures, a statistical model
is used to obtain maximum likelihood of the propagation model parameters with
great fitness [23]. In our work, we assume the model parameters with some errors,
are accessible either from historically empirical study, or statistical estimation.
Thus, the path loss propagation model, inferred from Eq. 6, can be written as
Fig. 5. Process of CR grouping and PUE attack detection.
Eq. 7, where C is a constant determined by reference propagation path loss, and
Γ is the empirical path loss exponent.
L = Pt − Pr = C + Γ · log10d+G (7)
Because G is a normal random variable, the optimal estimator of log10d is
obtained by averaging the propagation loss L. Thus, we smooth the RSS by
using a local averaging method from neighboring CR groups. Then, we apply
our hypothesis test to detect PUE attacks.
5.1 CRs Grouping
A RSS smoothing method that divides secondary network into circular areas has
been studied [6]. One major restriction of this method lies in the requirement
that all CR positions are known globally and CRs remain geographically static.
In our work, as discussed in Section 3, a dynamic CRN is assumed where CRs can
be either static or mobile, and the CRs are assumed unaware of their positions.
In order to estimate distance to the PU in a small area, a CR grouping technique
is applied, which assumes the distances between the PU and CRs in a group can
be uniformly treated as di,pu, where i represents the i-th CR as the group leader.
In comparison to clustering patterns in traditional wireless sensor networks
(WSNs), CRs grouping does not meant to construct a hierarchical CRN struc-
ture. Instead, it is a logical grouping process that is completed by the FC. The
grouping process is shown in Fig. 5. Every CR will maintain a dynamic neigh-
bor list by intermittently requesting in a short broadcasting range rneighbor. In
spectrum sensing stage, CRs will send their neighbor list along with the RSS
measurements to the FC, which enables the FC create a N×N binary CR neigh-
bor matrix Aneighbor with each element be denoted as ai,j . The FC will group
RSS measurements by rows (for every cr(i)), shown in Fig. 6. In each group, the
Fig. 6. CRs grouping and RSS smoothing diagram.
averaged propagation loss is computed as L∗i = Pt,pu − mean(Pr,k|∀ai,k = 1).
Further, the distance between the PU and each group is estimated as di,pu,
when it assumes all CRs in a group have approximately the same distance to
the PU, because di,pu  rneighbor.
5.2 Hypothesis test of PUE attack detection
In practical PUE attack detection, the hypothesis test defined in Section 4
is adopted. The propagation powers of the PU and attacker are denoted as
Pt,pu(dBm) and Pt,attacker(dBm), respectively, where the propagation power
difference, regarded as radiometric difference, is calculated as F (dB) = Pt,pu −
Pt,attacker.
Refer to Eq. 7, the distance between a transmitter and the i-th CR group is
estimated as:
dˆi = 10
(L∗i−C−ε)/Γ (8)
where ε is the ramaining error term. If the signal is transmitted by the PU, the
estimated distance is the approximate distance between i-the CR and the PU
dˆi,pu:
dˆi = dˆi,pu (9)
If the signal is transmitted by the attacker, the path loss is computed as:
L∗i =(Pt,attacker + F )−mean(Pr,k|∀Ai,k = 1) (10)
Thus, the estimated distance is a scaled approximate distance between i-the
CR and the attacker dˆi,attacker:
dˆi = dˆi,attacker · 10F/Γ (11)
As assumed in section 4, all CRs are randomly distributed in a circular area
with radius of rCRN . The transmitter-receiver distances satisfy:
di,pu − dj,pu ≤ 2 · rCRN ,∀i, j = 1, 2, · · · , N (12)
(di,attacker − dj,attacker) · 10F/Γ ≤ 2 · rCRN · 10F/Γ ,
∀i, j = 1, 2, · · · , N (13)
Refer to Eq. 9 and Eq. 11, the FC can apply the following hypothesis test:
– If dˆi − dˆj ≤ T, ∀i, j = 1, 2, · · · , N , the signal is from the PU (H0), or
– If dˆi − dˆj > T, ∃i, j = 1, 2, · · · , N , the signal is from the attacker (H1)
Here T is the threshold factor that affects the accuracy of the hypothesis
test. The probability of false negative can be calculated as:
Pfn = Pr{max(dˆi,attacker)−min(dˆj,attacker) ≤ T
10F/Γ
,
∀i, j = 1, 2, · · · , N}
≤ 1, if T
10(F+ε′)/Γ
> rCRN
≤ (1− ( rCRN−
T
10(F+ε
′)/Γ
rCRN
)2)N ,
if T
10(F+ε′)/Γ
≤ rCRN
(14)
where ε′ is the error term. The interpretation to Eq. 14 is similar to the one to
Eq. 5. It is noteworthy that the equality happens only when attacker is located
at some particular locations. The probability of false positive can be calculated
as:
Pfp = Pr{max(dˆi,pu)−min(dˆj,pu) > T,
∃i, j = 1, 2, · · · , N}
= 0, if T
10ε′/Γ
≥ 2 · rCRN
< 1− (α−
T
10ε
′/Γ
pi )
N ,
if T
10ε′/Γ
< 2 · rCRN
(15)
where cosα = rCRN−T/10
ε′/Γ
rCRN
. The Eq. 15 can be explained as the complementary
of the probability to the case that all CRs are located in the intersection area
between a ring-shape area with width of T
10ε′/Γ
and the CRN distributed area.
According to Eq. 14 and Eq. 15, with larger value of F and lower value false
negative rate Pfn, better hypothesis threshold factor T can be designed. With
the larger number of CRs N , the lower false negative rate Pfn can be achieved,
but a higher false positive rate Pfp may occur.
Fig. 7. Experiment deployment.
6 Real-world Emulation Trial
In this section, a deployment trail of our method in real-world PUE attack
detection is presented. To perform spectrum sensing in CRN, we used Universal
Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) N210 as the sensing nodes, one of which
acts as a smart PUE attacker. Due to the practical limitations, we are unbale
to emulate PU activities. Thus, we regard one of the local digital television
(DTV) station as the primary user. The PUE attacker impose malicious signal
on another unused spectrum band. In order to conduct effective attacks, the
smart attacker will mimic the DTV behavior: it will record the DTV signal from
near spectrum band and broadcast the exact received signal data.
We implemented the experiment in our lab. The attacker (one USRP N210)
is allocated to a fixed spot, and the sensing nodes (other USRP N210 Devices)
are placed in 6 different places/rooms, shown in Fig. 7. Due to lack of empirical
model parameters, we directly applied Hata propagation model for urban envi-
ronment [12]. The PU signal information is presented in Table 2, where hT is
the transmitter height. Accordingly, we take of the value of receiver height hR
as 10m.
The result is shown in Fig 8, which indicates an almost perfect detection. It
is because the great discrepancy between PU transmission power and attacker
transmission power (over 60 dB difference), despite the inaccurate propagation
model parameters. The sensing nodes will receive a relatively high power of PUE
Table 2. PU parameters
Frequency 590− 596 MHz
Power 345 kW
hT 278 m
Fig. 8. ROC of emulation.
attack signal if near to the attacker, but receive barely nothing if too far away
from the attacker. In next section, we will present more detail discussions on
detection performance regarding to model parameter errors and attacker trans-
mission power.
7 Numerical evaluation
7.1 Practical Model Evaluation
Further, a numerical experiment with more comprehensive network topology,
is designed to evaluate the proposed hypothesis test. The parameters in Eq. 7
is estimated from empirical study, which may not be the best estimation. The
empirical model we used for distance estimation is:
L = Cest + Γest · log10d+G (16)
While the best fit propagation model is:
L =(Cest − ε C) + (Γest − ε Γ ) · log10d+G
=Cest + Γest · (log10d− ε C
Γ
− ε Γ
Γ
log10d) (17)
where ε C and ε Γ are the empirical propagation model estimation errors (Cest−
Cbest = ε C and Γest−Γbest = ε Γ ). Thus, the estimated distance is, if signal is
transmitted by the PU:
dˆi = (dˆi,pu)
(1−ε Γ/Γ ) · 10−ε C/Γ (18)
Similarly, the estimated distance calculated based on the attacker transmis-
sion signal is:
dˆi = (dˆi,attacker)
(1−ε Γ/Γ ) · 10(−ε C/Γ+F/Γ ) (19)
Compared to Eq. 14 and Eq. 15, the empirical propagation model estimation
errors may increase both the false positive and false negative probabilities, due
to the increasing uncertainty from the estimated distance.
7.2 Numerical Test and Comparison
The designed test scenario is in a 3000m× 3000m field. The PU and the FC are
initially randomly located in the field. The PU is able to move. CRs and the
attacker are randomly distributed in a circular area with radius 500m. The best
fitted propagation model parameters, Cbest and Γbest, are designed by refering
to the empirical Hata model [12]. The model parameter errors follow Gaussian
distribution, defined as ε C ∼ (0, σ2ε C) and ε Γ ∼ (0, σ2ε Γ ). The details are
shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Parameter Setting
Field 3000m× 3000m
Cbest 111.76
Γbest 31.8
G ∼ (0, 82)
ε C ∼ (0, σ2ε C)
ε Γ ∼ (0, σ2ε Γ )
Pt,pu 50(dBw) = 100(W )
PU Mobility Yes
We have compared the performance of our proposal with a back propaga-
tion neural network (BPNN) based approach [20]. It is a PUE attack detection
scheme that does not need geographical information of the PU, which is similar
to our work. However, it does require CRs’ geographical information for both
training and testing process. Although there are other PUE attacks detection
methods, their strong assumptions make it inappropriate to compare them with
our approach. In the evaluation test, we apply a three layer BPNN with three
input nodes, four hidden nodes and two output nodes, as shown in Fig. 9.
Figures 10, 11, 12, and 13 present the comparison between our proposal and
the BPNN approach using the receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves
corresponding to different number of CRs (N) and different propagation power
differences (F ) under several different parameter error propagation models.
Fig. 9. BPNN structure for PUE attack detection.
Fig. 10. ROC of two approaches,, when σε C = 0 and σε Γ = 0, with different number
of CRs (N) and different attacker propagation power Pt,attacker.
The performance evaluation results in the figures show that both our pro-
posed approach and BPNN approach for PUE attack detection have achieved
better performance when there are larger number of CRs and larger propagation
power difference between the PU and the attacker. When compared all result
figures, however, it is shown that the BNPP approach is not sensitive to model
parameter errors σε C and σε Γ , while the performance of our approach greatly
depends on the accuracy of model estimation. It is because the training data
feeding to the neural network in BPNN approach is directly from real propa-
gation environment, thus the testing process does not rely on the propagation
model estimation. As shown in Figs. 10 and 11, on the other hand, our approach
achieves a superior performance when the propagation model is well estimated.
However, the comparison based only on performance does not provide a com-
prehensive vision. The BPNN is robust against the inaccuracy in propagation
model estimation because it is essentially empirical and learns from historical
data. Actually the BPNN detector does not work with the same inputs that are
required by our proposed method.
Fig. 11. ROC of two approaches,, when σε C = 3 and σε Γ = 1, with different number
of CRs (N) and different attacker propagation power Pt,attacker.
Fig. 12. ROC of two approaches, when σε C = 5 and σε Γ = 2, with different number
of CRs (N) and different attacker propagation power Pt,attacker.
In summary, our proposed detection approach possesses two major advan-
tages over the BPNN detector. Firstly, the BPNN approach requires CRs’ geo-
graphical information in both training and testing process, which may greatly
increase the cost by equipping CRs with extra peripherals, such as GPS, while
our approach does not rely on any prior geographical information. Secondly, in
our approach, no training process, especially supervised training process, is re-
quired. In PUE attack detection, training signal at receiver sides with tag of the
PU is not always available in practical. Therefore, our approach, compared to
BPNN detector, is more feasible in a wide selection of scenarios.
8 Conclusions
In this work, we proposed a novel PUE attack detection approach leveraging the
hard-to-mimic feature of high PU transmission power, compared to the attacker
transmission capability. The detection model considered many constraints in
Fig. 13. ROC of two approaches,, when σε C = 10 and σε Γ = 3, with different number
of CRs (N) and different attacker propagation power Pt,attacker.
real-world situations, such as mobile PUs, unknown geographical information
of each party, and the geographical randomness of PUs and attackers as well
as the CRN formation. Both theoretical analysis and experimental results have
validated our proposal.
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